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Abstract. For a transition to a sustainable energy future, smart grids
must adapt to the mass introduction of renewable energy sources and
their inherent unpredictability. The Power TAC competition is a sim-
ulation of distribution grid market dynamics with autonomous retail
broker agents. It seeks to reflect real-world scenarios and thus guide
policy and business decision-making. In Power TAC, these autonomous
agents (”brokers”) trade energy through markets and offer tariff con-
tracts to retail customers who consume and produce energy. By peri-
odic alignment with present real-world and alternative future scenarios,
Power TAC utilizes the autonomous agent competition structure to in-
vestigate sustainable solutions to electricity supply questions. We explore
how alignment activities between the 2014 and 2015 competition years,
in particular adding a high volume of retail solar production, made net
demand less predictable for brokers. It also made demand more volatile
in the 2015 competition, leading to more extreme peak demand events. A
principal alignment activity between 2015 and 2016 is the introduction of
peak-demand charges for brokers. We design a new peak-demand pricing
mechanism that reflects the costs of grid capacity usage, balancing real-
world practice against the constraints of the simulation environment. We
explore the effects of these changes on broker decisions that account for
imbalance and peak demand.
Keywords: smart grid, autonomous agents, energy markets, sustain-
ability, peak demand
1 Introduction
The conventional electricity supply chain produces energy in centralized, large-
scale generation facilities, then processes and distributes it to individual retail
and industrial consumers. However, with widespread adoption of renewable en-
ergy sources in the form of both large-scale mass generation facilities and small-
scale retail packages, this conventional centralized approach has begun to lose
relevance [18]. Many renewable sources have variable, weather-dependent energy
output, and many, such as rooftop solar facilities, are widely distributed small
units rather than large centralized generators. As a result, many energy cus-
tomers are producing energy as well as consuming it. Renewables accounted for
142 terawatt-hours of German energy production in 2012 (23% of total), and
Germany’s long-term goal is 80% renewables penetration by 2050 [6]. The US
state of California has set a 2020 target of 33 percent renewable energy produc-
tion [7]. However, this fast adoption is not without risk.
The primary forms of renewable energy that are experiencing fast growth
are wind and solar power. Though providing sustainable and renewable energy
at essentially zero marginal cost, both these energy sources are heavily weather-
dependent. Weather forecasting is at best stochastic and at worst lucky guesses,
thus making the future output of these energy sources uncertain. On the de-
mand side, electricity demand has been almost entirely inelastic, partly because
electricity users pay a flat rate for energy, and have little or no visibility into
their current or projected usage. Thus, the transmission and distribution grids
face the difficult task of balancing inelastic demand and volatile supply [12].
Another task further complicated by introducing renewable energy sources,
in particular solar power, is maintaining supply reliability in the face of demand
peaks. In a given region, consumer energy consumption typically peaks in the
morning when people are preparing for the day, and in early evening when they
return home. In areas with high air-conditioning loads, peak demand may fall in
the late afternoon when heat load peaks, and in areas that depend on electricity
for winter heating, demand may peak at night when the heat load is highest.
However, fixed solar energy installations typically follow a sinusoidal profile on
sunny days, between sunrise and sunset, and may show considerable volatility on
days with scattered clouds. In most areas, demand peaks do not coincide with
peak output of solar panels. Hence, peak demand will remain a significant issue
in the future.
An electricity distribution network’s capacity must be designed to handle
peak loads. Thus, grid capacity is generally dependent on demand at peak hours.
However, the amount of energy that is transferred through the grid is regularly
lower. With higher peaks, a larger portion of capacity investment is needed
to prevent congestion, and this additional capacity is left under-used during
non-peak demand. These capacity costs, which are mainly at the transmission
level, trickle down from the distribution grid to individual customers as grid
connection costs. As energy peak-to-average ratios increase, these costs take
higher percentages of a customer’s total energy bill. Thus, it is in consumer
economic interest to mitigate peak demand.
There are quite a few methods proposed to tackle this issue. Smart grid
technology has advanced to a degree that makes many possible solutions feasi-
ble [23]. However, these technologies differ in their actual practicality. Motivating
small-scale users to shift their hourly energy use with time-of-use pricing does
not currently seem promising [5, 11]. Another solution, the use of demand re-
sponse resources, such as energy storage units, shows enormous potential [21],
albeit lagging on actual current use [19]. Consequently, market mechanisms that
encourage demand response resource use are a hot research topic.
Many studies have analyzed such market mechanism models [24, 17, 22]. How-
ever, most of these studies lag behind on reproducibility and verifiability, as their
real-world data sources and simulation environments induce modeling biases that
distort cross-study comparisons. In addition, the singularity of solving the re-
search problem with one approach may leave unexplored the remainder of the
design space. One suggested approach to minimize these biases and foster full
exploration of the design space is through Competitive Benchmarking (CB) [16].
CB contains three central elements. The Platform, a shared foundation among
a series of stakeholders, would in this case be a shared competitive simulation
environment for a variety of participant researchers. Alignment is conducted pe-
riodically to improve the platform’s various elements through reflection of and
adaptation to real-world scenarios. Process activities involve integrating input
as autonomous agents from participant stakeholders and running periodic com-
petitions between these agents. Processes evaluate the performance of both the
platform and the stakeholders’ agents.
The Power Trading Agent Competition (Power TAC) 3 is a CB approach for
simulating electricity market dynamics at the distribution level [13]. In Power
TAC, autonomous agents (also known as “brokers”) seek individual profits in
a competitive retail market by brokering energy and resources in a distribution
grid. By means of this ”smart market” simulation, we can understand how a
variety of market mechanisms, retail decisions, and real-world events can poten-
tially affect the electricity supply chain [4]. Previously, Power TAC has been the
testbed of research on Time-of-Use retail tariffs [25], autonomous agents [20, 8],
and market strategy [3]. It is central for the applicability and quality of these
research endeavors that the platform they are based upon retains relevance to
the real world.
In past Finals competitions, the Power TAC simulation accounted for peak
demand as a fixed capacity cost incurred by an agent’s total energy transport
through the distribution grid. However, this pricing scheme proved to have some
drawbacks. It did not align well with real-world practice, where markets usually
charge higher costs for higher electricity capacity use. It also did not suitably mo-
tivate autonomous brokers to suppress peak demand (i.e. flatten their demand).
These findings suggested that an alignment activity was required to improve the
pricing mechanism for peak demand.
In this research, we came across the following findings:
– Peak demand pricing is a significant missing element in the Power TAC
simulation. In the 2015 competition, brokers did not balance their supply and
demand well, and also generally did not utilize demand response resources.
A lack of capacity charges based on peak demand may be a contributing
factor to both.
– Some real world practices cannot be exactly implemented in an alignment
activity. Thus, a suitable mechanism needs to reflect but not replicate the
original practice. We analyze and discuss the possible implications of this
differing activity.
3 see www.powertac.org
– We explain and offer the peak demand pricing mechanism for Power TAC
2016 as an alternative method for pricing capacity use in the real world.
In this article, we elaborate on a new pricing mechanism for grid capacity
use based on peak demand. We first provide some background information on
capacity pricing and peak demand in Section 2. We describe the Power TAC com-
petition’s simulation environment in Section 3. Section 4 follows with a detailed
explanation of the analysis that led to the pricing mechanism. We conclude with
a brief overview of this analysis’ limitations and possible future work in Section
5.
2 Background on Capacity Pricing
Energy delivery in an electricity supply chain is done in two parts. First the
transmission grid processes and dilutes generated electricity into voltages that
can be transported over long distances. This is generally done by entities known
as Regional Transmission Organizations (RTO) or Independent System Opera-
tors (ISO) in the United States, and by Transmission System Operators (TSO)
in Europe. Next, the distribution grid further adjusts the alternating current
voltage to values that make the electricity usable by end consumers. Most costs
incurred in energy transportation are from investments and operations and main-
tenance activities at the transmission level. These costs are passed down to the
distribution grid operators, who in turn charge consumers for their contribution
to capacity use.
In the real world, grid operators usually charge end consumers based on their
contribution to a series of peak demand in some prior timespan. This is usu-
ally mandated by the transmission level operator to the distribution grid’s load
serving entities (LSE), who then divides this charge based on each consumer’s
energy consumption share. For example, in the United States, one LSE charges
customers connected to the Midwest Independent System Operator (MISO) grid
for their contribution to a monthly demand peak. However, their customers who
are connected to the Pennsylvania Jersey Maryland Interconnection (PJM) get
charged based on 5 peak hours in the previous year with a similar energy share
cost. For the New York Independent System Operator (NYISO) and New Eng-
land Independent System Operator’s (ISO-NE) connections, they consider only
the maximum peak hour in the previous year.4
There does not appear to be much research on peak demand fees and how
such a pricing mechanism should be formed in a competitive energy market. It
appears to us that such a research topic has been left relatively under-studied.
Feldman et al conducted a short case study of the potential savings if peak
demand is reduced or held constant using demand response resources [10]. Their
regional scope was the US states of Illinois and Massachusetts. They conclude
that the costs for DR resources associated with these controls are much less than
4 see www.directenergybusiness.com/landing/pdf/UNDERSTANDING-
CAPACITY.pdf
the potential economic benefits of reducing peak demand. Aside from this, there
is little research on how various pricing mechanisms impose costs and benefits
upon various stakeholders.
3 The Power Trading Agent Competition
Fig. 1. Schematic diagram of the Power Trading Agent Competition (from [14]).
Power TAC is a competitive simulation of a retail electricity market. Within
a CB platform, autonomous broker agents trade energy and resources with var-
ious entities (Figure 1), including residential and business consumers as well as
demand response facilities. Trading happens through a wholesale market, a bal-
ancing market, and a retail tariff market. Each broker seeks profit maximization
by balancing an energy supply and demand. Brokers have many resources that
can be utilized to this end, but power generally flows from purchases in the
wholesale market through tariff subscriptions to consumer subscribers.
The competition normally consists of a tournament of games. Each game is
a competition between various brokers in the simulation environment. In Power
TAC 2015 and 2014, this environment simulated a small city with a population of
about 100000 people over a period of about 8 1/2 weeks. Broker actions, demand
and supply, and market dynamics are segmented into time slots of one hour.
Weather forecasting is borrowed from real-world data of an undisclosed location,
which is used to influence the generation of weather-dependent energy sources.
To focus on the economic aspects of market design, most physical limitations of
electricity grids are simplified in Power TAC. Within the confines of the Power
TAC markets and the tariff guidelines, brokers are free to employ all market
capabilities to obtain a higher overall profit. More information on the Power
TAC 2015 competition can be found in the game specification [14]
3.1 The Retail Tariff Market
Broker revenues and demand is generally expected to come through the retail
tariff market. Within this market, brokers publish tariffs, which are evaluated by
customers, who then choose among the most economically rational tariffs (There
is however some customer choice uncertainty and random churn). These tariffs
bind brokers to supply energy (or in the case of producers, purchase energy) to
the tariff subscribers, who are in turn expected to pay (or for producers, receive)
the costs associated with their energy delivery.
Brokers have a variety of options for customizing customer tariffs. Time-of-
use pricing, dynamic pricing, tiered pricing, and capacity controls (i.e. demand
response resources) are among the more interesting from a research perspective.
Customers evaluate tariffs on a non-persistent basis. Their choice to evaluate
published tariffs is expected to follow a probability function that is reset to 0
when a tariff is subscribed to and increases gradually over time. The customers’
tariff evaluation follows a utility estimation function. This utility function de-
pends on the published tariff’s details and gives a specific utility value for each
tariff. This value is compared against an inconvenience factor, which accounts for
customer disfavor to switch tariffs or brokers and for certain tariff types (such as
inconvenience from time-of-use pricing). If the utility gain of a tariff exceeds the
inconvenience of the tariff itself and of switching tariffs, the customer switches
to that tariff.
A broker’s subscriber portfolio can consist of energy consumers, energy pro-
ducers, and demand response resource providers. Some subscribers can be a
combination of the three, but subscribers mainly consume energy.
3.2 The Wholesale Market
The Power TAC wholesale market operates similar to most traditional energy
exchange markets. It functions based on a periodic double auction, similar to
the NordPool or FERC [2]. Within each hour of the simulation, each broker can
place an order for purchase (ask) or sale (bid) of energy for any of the next
24 hours. Thus, in each timeslot, the market may need to process bids or asks
from the previous 1 to 24 timeslots. These offers must contain energy quantity
information, but do not need to necessarily contain price information. That is,
a broker may bid for x kilowatt hours of energy without any price, or at price
y per kilowatt hour. Bids and asks are matched in order of price, and the last
matched bid and ask define the market’s clearing price for that timeslot. Every
bid and ask is processed at this price. Thus, a broker that has not specified a
price in their ask (bid), must pay (will receive) whatever price the market clears
at. If the last bid is partially matched with an ask, only the matched energy
amount will be transacted.
In addition to the brokers, two other market participants trade in the whole-
sale market:
– Generation companies, or Gencos, are wholesale energy suppliers. In the
previous competitions, an abstract Genco entity also submitted a multitude
of bids and asks that simulated a quadratic supply curve. The coefficients of
the quadratic curve vary over time through a mean-reverting random walk.
The Genco’s bid quantities are selected from a normal distribution.
– An external Buyer trades energy on behalf of parties outside the scope of
the simulation. This Buyer entity is mainly meant to provide liquidity to
brokers who wish to sell energy through bids. The Buyer’s bids also add
some uncertainty to market clearing prices.
In Power TAC, brokers are expected to obtain the bulk of their energy supply
through the wholesale market. However, due to various uncertainties, in partic-
ular the unpredictability in supply arising from weather dependencies, they can
sometimes have either excess or insufficient energy at the end of each timeslot.
But an electricity grid requires near-perfect balancing at each moment, so a
balancing market solves the grid imbalance problem.
3.3 The Balancing Market
In the Power TAC Simulation, after all market transactions between brokers and
customers are carried out, a balancing market calculates broker imbalances and
charges them accordingly. In this market, brokers are charged trading prices for
imbalance that are much less appealing than wholesale market prices. However,
they are also allowed here to utilize demand response resources through balanc-
ing orders. The process for choosing balancing orders is similar to a one-sided
auction, and for each order that is cleared a VCG payment is computed against
the other orders (more information in [9]).
The balancing market seeks to:
– motivate use of demand response resources for grid balancing,
– discourage carrying energy excess or deficiency into the balancing market,
and
– encourage keeping a balance opposite to that of the (expected) total imbal-
ance.
The balancing market is meant to respond to that portion of the supply and
demand balancing problem that relates to unpredictability. That is, it is not
meant to satisfy energy demand, but to compensate for inaccuracies in broker
predictions, and reward better prediction algorithms. In the case that demand
response resources are not enough to mitigate balancing, a regulating market
entity provides additional balancing capacity. This entity trades at prices that
are much less attractive than similar trades in the other markets.
4 Aligning Peak Demand Costs
Between each competition year of Power TAC, routine alignment activities re-
calibrate the real-world applicability of the simulation. These activities are also
meant to maintain the simulation’s suitability for research studies.
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Fig. 2. Imbalance and net demand for the 2014 and 2015 Power TAC Finals competi-
tions.
In this regard, to reflect a similar trend in the real world, the Power TAC 2014
competition year saw an introduction of capacity control capabilities for man-
aging demand response. Likewise, the 2015 competition year saw the following
additions:
– The advent of residential solar “prosumers”, residential consumers who have
added a solar photovoltaic electricity generation installation for their house-
hold.
– Addition of electric vehicle (EV) owners, who organize the use and charging
of an EV and its use as demand response.
– Introduction of an electric forklift truck fleet model, which aggregates data
from a fleet of electric forklifts operating in an industrial warehouse setting,
as both a consumer and a demand response mechanism.
After analyzing the results of the 2015 Finals competition, we realized that bro-
kers largely ignored the demand response resources. That is, they left imbalances
in the balancing market for the regulating market entity to solve. Moreover, the
sudden increase of solar prosumers drastically increased their imbalances and
significantly decreased their net demand during daylight hours (Figure 2). Thus,
the main alignment activity that changed the competition’s dynamics was the
first item, i.e. the advent of solar prosumers. How a sudden increase in solar pro-
duction affected the imbalance market and its pricing mechanisms are studied
in another research activity [1]. Here, we focus on capacity use by brokers.
In the real world, grid capacity is strongly dependent on the maximum total
energy extracted from the transmission level by the distribution system oper-
ator (DSO). Most of these costs are incurred at the transmission level, where
investments in generation facilities, power lines, and transmission station infras-
tructure dominate the costs of energy supply and transport. Modern electricity
supply markets charge for capacity as a surcharge on electricity use. This sur-
charge is calculated as a function of maximum net demand during some time
period in the past, usually in the timescale of months or years (details in Section
2). This pricing mechanism has inflexibility issues, however, in particular since
daily demand curves (which typically resemble the demand plots in Figure 2)
are strongly dependent on the time of year.
In the previous Power TAC Finals, capacity use was charged as a fixed sur-
charge through the wholesale market for electricity delivery. This fixed charge
not only does not reflect similar pricing in the real world, but also does not set
up a suitable correlation scheme between capacity use and actual maximum de-
mand. Thus, we here discuss the setup of another pricing mechanism for Power
TAC. This pricing scheme closely follows real-world cost structures, but retains
some flexibility to allow for both its execution in the simulation and support
research on dynamic peak demand pricing.
To find a suitable mechanism for pricing capacity, we first looked at the
net demand in the 2014 and 2015 Finals competitions (Figure 3). This value is
the energy expected to be pulled from the transmission system operator (TSO)
by the DSO, and is directly correlated with actual delivery costs. Net demand
for the 2014 competition showed an average of 52.95 MWh, with a standard
deviation of 13.20 MWh, whereas the same values for the 2015 competition were
44.23 MWh and 17.25 MWh, respectively. These values were calculated over all
games in each competition. The decrease in average and increase in standard
deviation can both be attributed to the advent of residential solar producers.
To compare how the higher end of the net demand values appeared, we also
studied peak demand. We defined peak demand as the maximum overall demand
during each week of the simulation. Both the 2014 and 2015 Finals competitions
showed a significant number of peak demand events (Figure 4). However, we
found that peak demand events tend to not vary between competitions. Thus,
they are not significantly related to the 2015 Finals’ increase of residential solar.
Also, peak demand appeared mostly in the early evening and occasionally in the
early morning hours.
Based on these findings, we suggested the following pricing mechanism for
capacity charges:
Fig. 3. Normalized net demand histograms for the 2014 and 2015 Power TAC Finals
competitions.
Fig. 4. Normalized peak demand histograms for the 2014 and 2015 Power TAC Finals
competitions.
– First, brokers pay a small fixed fee per customer connection in each timeslot.
This fee accounts for the capacity and the operations and management costs
of the distribution grid. Small and large customers will pay different prices,
since they utilize the distribution grid in somewhat different ways.
– Second, capacity charges will be computed at the end of each week, comput-
ing the highest n peaks in that week that go above a certain threshold. This
threshold will be set to meandemand + 1.2× stdevdemand, where meandemand
and stdevdemand are the average and standard deviation of demand in all
prior timeslots. The amount that each peak exceeds the threshold is multi-
plied by a fee, and the resultant amount defines the peak demand charge.
This peak demand charge is divided among brokers based on their demand
share (i.e. the total demand of their contracted customers divided by the
total demand) during that peak time.
The values of the fee for energy over the threshold and other parameters can be
adjusted to suitably reflect real-world capacity costs.
The dynamic portion of the capacity charge would motivate brokers to both
a) avoid demand in potential peak demand timeslots, and b)attempt to keep an
energy demand portfolio that has more constant energy use on an hourly basis.
Correctly applied, this mechanism is meant to smoothen the higher ridges of
each day’s demand curve. Although high demand is discouraged, low demand
is not. Brokers can be expected to obtain portfolios farther from the generally
expected daily demand plot. Thus, there is a possibility that more demand un-
predictability will be introduced into the market with this addition. The resulting
unpredictability of this addition can be an avenue of future research.
5 Conclusions and Future Work
The Power TAC simulation was designed to be a test bed for future energy
trends. It seeks to both guide policy and business decisions and provide a basis
for quantitative research on competitive energy markets. However, such a CB
approach’s value lies in retaining real-world applicability. This matter requires
regular assessment through alignment activities.
In this article, we presented an alignment activity for the Power TAC 2016
competition year. We first discussed the potential need for a peak demand pricing
mechanism within the simulation. We provided a pricing mechanism for the
Power TAC simulation which is both feasible in the simulation environment and
applicable to practice. This pricing mechanism has been implemented in the
2016 Power TAC competition year [15]. It has been calibrated to result in fees
similar to those charged in real-world consumer energy bills. This mechanism’s
functionality and influence on Power TAC’s dynamics will be assessed in the
2016 Finals competition in July 2016.
There are many possible research opportunities regarding the peak demand
issue. One important investigation could be the effect of this new mechanism on
Power TAC’s market dynamics. We chose to implement a somewhat static capac-
ity pricing option, to reflect similar pricing scenarios in the real world. However,
other pricing mechanisms, such as dynamic pricing, could also be viable. Explor-
ing other possible methods could introduce better methods for pricing capacity
use. With the increased use of volatile renewable energy sources, the effect of
these sources on peak demand also remains an open question. A study of regu-
lation requirements for capacity pricing could also inform policy and legislation
decisions.
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